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CASE NOTES
NUISANCE-NO RIGHT TO INTERFERENCE-FREE
TELEVISION RECEPTION
The John Hancock Center had scarcely reached its completion and
been able to savor the distinction of being the world's tallest building in
1970 when Sears, Roebuck and Company announced its intention to
erect a 110 story structure, ten stories above Hancock's century mark,
on a full city block near Chicago's Loop. Construction of the Sears
Tower became the subject of litigation in the spring of 1972 after the
disclosure that the building would reflect television broadcast signals from
transmitters on lower Chicago buildings causing distorted reception in
suburban areas. The State's Attorney' of Lake County, the northeastern
most county in Illinois, brought an action to enjoin the completion of the
building as it approached the sixtieth floor, arguing that the structure would
constitute a public nuisance by distorting television reception and would
lead to depressed property values. On appeal, after defendant Sears'
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action was granted, 2 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding interference with
television reception in certain metropolitan areas, the landowner's right
to construct a building was subject only to restrictive legislation. Further-
more, injunctive relief was not warranted for television reception inter-
ference because it did not constitute an actionable nuisance. People
ex rel. Hoogasian v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.3
In a day of split-second communications, millions of persons have come
to rely upon radio and television as modes of promulgation or reception
of information, current news, entertainment and educational material.
Yet, no matter how reliant the public may be upon its television and radio,
1. On the duty of the State's Attorney to bring actions on behalf of the citi-
zenry in Illinois, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 5(l) (1971).
2. A second action was brought in the Circuit Court of Cook County by the
Villages of Deerfield, Northbrook and Skokie and officials thereof on behalf of
their respective residents making substantially the same allegations as the Lake
County officials. After the Lake County dismissal, this action was dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action and as being barred by res judicata. Appeals were
joined.
3. 52 Ill.2d 301, 287 N.E.2d 677 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972).
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there has been no development of a public or private right to receive
broadcasts without interference. The Sears case is the first to have a
plaintiff viewer assert a claim for the public against a party interfering
with television reception. In spite of the outcome, it is significant that
as the public's protection in environmental and consumer matters expands,
steps have been taken to determine whether the vast American viewing
public will have any right to maintain or demand interference-free tele-
vision reception. The public, which has recognized and begun to utilize
the extensive resources of television broadcasting in the past several de-
cades, was given a fleeting opportunity to assert its interests though they
were not ultimately supported.
The purpose of this note shall be to briefly consider nuisance and the
role of equity in nuisance cases. The development of private and public
rights in airspace will be studied to delineate the boundaries within which
those rights exist and might, arguendo, be applied to broadcast signals.
Particular attention will be paid to those cases which have dealt with
emitted or reflected light as a nuisance. Finally, the Sears case will be
analyzed with consideration given to the lack of available remedies for
broadcast interference and to the litigation involving the broadcast industry.
It is well settled that a land owner has free use of his property so long
as the use is within the bounds of applicable zoning, public health and
public welfare statutory provisions and so long as the use is not so
unreasonable that it creates a nuisance to others. 4 Nuisance has been used
to describe "everything that endangers life or health, gives offense to the
senses, violates the laws of decency or obstructs the reasonable and com-
fortable use of property." 5  The term, which courts have held to be
incapable of precise definition to fit all fact situations, 6 might be defined
as being
applied to that class of wrongs which arises from the unreasonable, unwarrantable,
or unlawful use by a person of his own property [which] produces such material
annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or hurt that the law will presume a conse-
quent damage. 7
4. Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling, 264 Ky. 470, 95 S.W.2d 1 (1936).
One court asserts that "the proposition that a man may use his property as he sees
fit, [is] subject to restriction (1) if he violates any provision of the state or federal
constitutions, or (2) if he uses his property so as to create a nuisance, or (3) if
he violates any restrictive covenant, or (4) if he violates any valid laws, including
zoning ordinances." Derry Borough v. Shomo, 5 Pa. Cmwlth. 216, 221, 289 A.2d
513, 516 (1972). The ancient maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas-use your
own property in such a manner as not to injure the property of another-should be
recalled. See Musumeci v. Leonardo, 77 R.I. 255, 75 A.2d 175 (1950).
5. Hall v. Putney, 291 Ill. App. 508, 516, 10 N.E.2d 204, 207 (1937).
6. See, e.g., Engle v. State, 53 Ariz. 458, 90 P.2d 988 (1939); Patterson v.
1973]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
By itself, that statement covers a rather broad spectrum which must of
necessity be narrowed.
Finding interference with the reasonable use and enjoyment of one's
property alone is not quite enough to maintain an action for nuisance.
With that interference, one must scrutinize the reasonableness of the use
of the offender's property and the gravity of the injury to the complainant. s
This investigation is made in light of the neighborhood,9 the degree of
sensitivity of ordinary persons to the act, 10 and the value to the public,
if any, of the offender's action or business."
It is clearly understood that inhabitants of our cities, industrial com-
munities and densely populated suburbs "must submit to the annoyance
of city life" 12 and endure some amount of nuisance from noise, dirt, smoke
and other discomforts. As one court has written, "the only way in which
[such nuisances] can be avoided is by seclusion from . . . the busy
activities of the age . . . .1 While damages may ensue from a
nuisance, balancing with locale often yields damnum absque injuria-a
damage without actionable legal injury. 14
Peabody Coal Co., 3 Ill. App.2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (1954); Lehmkuhl v. Junc-
tion City, 179 Kan. 389, 295 P.2d 621 (1956).
7. Gardner v. Int'l Shoe Co., 319 Ill. App. 416, 433, 49 N.E.2d 328, 335 (1943),
af'd, 386 Ill. 418, 54 N.E.2d 482 (1944). See also Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. City
of Chicago, 352 Ill. 11, 185 N.E. 170 (1933); City of Somerset v. Sears, 313 Ky.
784, 233 S.W.2d 530 (1950); Hood v. Slefkin, 88 R.I. 178, 143 A.2d 683 (1958).
8. Louisville Refining Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181, 186 (Ky. 1960).
9. Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 251 Mass. 479, 486, 146 N.E. 787, 789 (1925).
10. Munie v. Millner, 245 Ill.App. 257 (1924). There can be no recovery for
delicate or sensitive use of property. Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State
Toll Highway Comm'n, 34 Ill.2d 544, 216 N.E.2d 788 (1966); Dep't of Pub.
Works & Bldgs. v. Bloomer, 28 Ill.2d 267, 191 N.E.2d 245 (1963).
11. See generally Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
12. City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal Co., 260 Ill. 111, 130, 102 N.E. 992,
999 (1913).
13. Hamm v. Gunn, 113 S.W. 304, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908). Generally, the
Maryland Court of Appeals explained that, "[tihere are certain inconveniences and
discomforts incident to living in a city or in a thickly settled suburban community.
These discomforts must be endured as part of the privilege [or at least of the ful-
fillment of the desire] of living in close proximity to other people. But these
discomforts must not be more than those ordinarily to be expected in the com-
munity, and incident to the lawful use of the offending property or business." Five
Oaks Corp. v. Gathman, 190 Md. 348, 355, 58 A.2d 656, 659 (1948). Accord,
Merriam v. McConnell, 31 Ill.App.2d 241, 175 N.E.2d 293 (1961) (box elder
trees); Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N.W. 109 (1932)
(wholesale poultry factory); Ebur v. Alloy Metal Wire Co., 304 Pa. 177, 155
A. 280 (1931) (wire mill). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822,
comment g at 70 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
14. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938).
872 [Vol. =XI
The peculiar hypersensitivity of a person may not be considered because
the sense test for an actionable nuisance is objective. Therefore, trifling
inconveniences suffered by persons having fastidious habits and delicate
sensibilities are set aside to allow the habits and senses of ordinary persons
to determine the standard. Application of the standard will yield a deter-
mination whether the complainant's physical comfort and enjoyment has
been subjected to an actionable, substantial and material interference.'r
Finally, a public policy consideration may be taken into account to
balance the injury with the relative public necessity of the alleged
offender's conduct. Unless the activity is an unreasonable and unnecessary
public annoyance of greater measure than its service to the public, then
that "interference restraining normal industrial activities is contrary to
public policy .. ."16
Generally, nuisances may be subdivided into those which are private,
interfering with the use and enjoyment of the property of an individual
or small group of individuals,' 7 and those which are public, causing an-
noyance, inconvenience or injury to the community as a whole.' 8 While
public nuisances are generally subject to abatement only by public
authorities through civil or criminal action,19 a private action may lie for
a public nuisance where the complainant can show that his property has
sustained some special injury not common to the public. 20 The distinction
between public and private nuisances must be considered with each new
fact situation so that proper remedial action may be selected.
To augment or supplant the legal remedy of damages, courts of chancery
15. City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal Co., 260 I11. 111, 126, 102 N.E. 992,
998 (1913). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 F, comment c at 59-60
and comment d at 60-61 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970) and note the recent revisions
to the general rule of § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
16. Gardner v. Int'l Shoe Co., 319 Ill.App. 416, 433, 49 N.E.2d 328, 335
(1943), ajj'd, 386 Ill. 418, 54 N.E.2d 482 (1944).
17. Merriam v. McConnell, 31 Ill.App.2d 241, 175 N.E.2d 293 (1961). See
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 1084 (1960); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3481 (West 1970); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 D (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
18. People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 247, 172 N.E. 485, 486 (1930). See
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-601 (1956); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 1970);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 B (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
19. See ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 1085 (1960); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3493-95, CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 26528 (West 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05 (1969), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1972); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-60-2, 21-20, ch. 1001/2 §§ 2, 16, 19
(1971).
20. Klumpp v. Rhoads, 362 Ill. 412, 200 N.E. 153 (1936). See CAL. CIrv. CODE
§§ 3493, 3495 (West 1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 C (Tent.
Draft No. 16, 1970); Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv.
997 (1966).
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have acted to abate nuisances. 21
Courts of equity have power to give relief, whether against public or private nui-
sances, by compelling their abatement or restraining the continuance of their exist-
ence . . . . Wherever the legal right is clearly established and the unreasonable and
unlawful use of property to the injury of others is clearly proved, it is not necessary
that the question should be first determined in a suit at law.
22
Public interest is a key to the extent of equitable relief available. In
Virginia Railway v. System Federation,23 Mr. Justice Stone expressed the
often quoted view that: "[c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go
much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public
interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are
involved. '" 2
4
As previously indicated, courts look for clearly established cases of
actual, substantial injury before granting equitable relief. 2' To that point,
there is a reluctance to exercise the extreme powers of abatement. 26
Regardless, injunctive relief will be granted for abatement of public
nuisances as found at common law or within criminal statutory pro-
visions. 27
While equity generally will not enjoin a threatened or anticipated nui-
sance in advance of actual injury,28 mandatory injunctions have been used
to cause removal of structures which have become nuisances by violation
of zoning regulations 29 or by encroachment upon the property of another.' 0
21. Equity will not grant injunctive relief as a matter of course on every show-
ing of relief at law. Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Co., 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 545 (1862); Haack v. Lindsay Light & Chem. Co., 393 Ill. 367, 66 N.E.
2d 391 (1946).
22. City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal Co., 260 Ill. 111, 122-24, 102 N.E.
992, 997 (1913).
23. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
24. Id. at 552. See also Public Utilities Comm'n v. Capital Transit Co., 214
F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1954); DuPage County v. Henderson, 402 111. 179, 83 N.E.2d
720 (1949).
25. Nichols v. City of Rock Island, 3 Ill.2d 531, 538, 121 N.E.2d 799, 803
(1954).
26. Bauman v. Piser Undertakers Co., 34 IUI.App.2d 145, 180 N.E.2d 705
(1962).
27. City of Chicago v. Fritz, 36 Ill. App. 2d 457, 184 N.E.2d 713 (1962).
28. Kubby v. Hammond, 68 Ariz. 17, 198 P.2d 134 (1948) (automobile wreck-
ing plant). But see Patton v. Carter, 197 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (live-
stock auction barns and pens). As to anticipatory nuisance from erection of struc-
tures, see Annots., 7 A.L.R. 749, 763 (1920); 26 A.L.R. 937, 940 (1923); 55
A.L.R. 880, 884 (1928).
29. Welton v. 40 E. Oak St. Bldg. Corp., 70 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1934). See
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.17 (1963).
30. Pradelt v. Lewis, 297 Ill. 374, 130 N.E. 785 (1921). See also Gerstley v.
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Where, however, the conduct of the alleged offender's business and the
construction of his building are within the terms of appropriate licensing,
if any, and in compliance with applicable statutory provisions, there
is no actionable nuisance.3 ' It is settled that the authority of state or local
government to establish zoning regulations arises from the exercise of its
police power A2  Based upon a premise of common public welfare,
regulations must reasonably and substantially relate to the health, safety,
comfort and morals of the public . 3
These principles were applied in Welton v. 40 East Oak St. Building
Corporation3 4 where the defendant erected a twenty-story building which
failed to comply with a Chicago zoning requirement that for every nine
feet of rise above seventy-two feet, a structure was to have a one foot
set-back. The building was completed in spite of litigation in state
courts. Coming ultimately before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, the case was remanded for issuance of a mandatory injunction
compelling reconstruction of the building in conformance with local
regulations. The court grounded injunctive relief in the special damage
suffered by owners of adjoining premises found to be the result of the
mere violation of the ordinance.3 5
In spite of defendant's argument that the equities should be balanced
to consider the great financial loss he would suffer by issuance of the
mandatory injunction, the court held that there would be no balancing5 6
A view on city life dissimilar to that held by many courts was presented:
Globe Wernicke Co., 340 Ill. 270, 172 N.E. 829 (1930) (bridge between buildings
over public alley); Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 556, 37 N.E. 850 (1894) (same); The
Fair v. Evergreen Park Shopping Plaza, 4 I1. App.2d 454, 124 N.E.2d 649 (1954)
(portion of building erected on land held by tenant under easement); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 100',2, § 26(5) (1971). But see Methodist Episcopal Soc'y v. Akers, 167
Mass. 560, 46 N.E. 381 (1897); Crocker v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 61 App. Div.
226, 70 N.Y.S. 492 (1901).
31. Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 251 Mass. 479, 146 N.E. 787 (1925).
32. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), revg 297
F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
33. See Liebling v. Village of Deerfield, 21 Ill.2d 196, 171 N.E.2d 585 (1961);
City of Loves Park v. Woodward Governor Co., 14 Ill.2d 623, 153 N.E.2d 560
(1958); Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501
(1971).
34. 70 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1934).
35. Id. at 380. See also Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., 106 Conn. 475, 138
A. 483 (1927) for the proposition that a structure is a public nuisance when in a
place forbidden by law.
36. See Gerstley v. Globe Wernicke Co., 340 Ill. 270, 172 N.E. 829 (1930);
Pradelt v. Lewis, 297 Ill. 374, 130 N.E. 785 (1921); Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Spencer
Wire Co., 203 Mass. 448, 89 N.E. 534 (1909). Contra, Golden Press Inc. v.
Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951).
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In the fight for better living conditions in large cities, in the contest for more light
and air, more health and comfort-the scales are not well balanced if dividends to
the individuals outweigh health and happiness to the community.37
It is clear then that upon the finding of an actionable nuisance, public or
private, equitable relief may be available to abate the nuisance even
where a great expense is suffered by the offending party.
As television signals are transmitted through the air without regard to
ownership of the property beneath, it is important to review the law of
air ownership. The ancient doctrine of air ownership, cujus est solum
ejus est usque ad coelum-he who owns the soil owns the sky above it 3a -
has been subjected to diminished application since the advent of air
transportation 9 with its subsequent acquisition of the heavens.40 Who
owns the vast expanses of the air above this nation? By statute, the
Congress has vested airspace with national sovereignty. 4 ' A sequence
of cases did much to provide the nexus between the decline of the maxim
noted and the foundation of national sovereignty.
The Ninth Circuit was called upon in 1936 to consider an action for
alleged trespass and imposition of servitude on the plaintiff's land by
the aircraft belonging to the defendants. 42 The court in Hinman made
the following finding:
Title to the airspace unconnected with the use of land is inconceivable. Such a
right has never been asserted.
This formula 'from the center of the earth to the sky' was invented at some remote
time in the past when the use of space above land actual or conceivable was con-
fined to narrow limits, and simply meant that the owner of the land could use the
overlying space to such an extent as he was able, and that no one could ever inter-
fere with that use.
This formula was never taken literally, but was a figurative phrase to express the
37. Welton v. 40 E. Oak St. Bldg. Corp., 70 F.2d 377, 383 (7th Cir. 1934).
38. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *18.
39. Among older cases see Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (where the Court found servitude on plaintiff's prop-
erty taken by firing of defendant's guns); Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186
N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906) (ejectment action against telephone wire above
plaintiff's land).
40. Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. N.Y.
1955) (holding, inter alia, that the doctrine of private ownership of air is no longer
the law).
41. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1108, 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1970). But see
Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal.2d 582, 394 P.2d 548(1964) (finding federal aviation legislation non-exclusive); Illinois Aeronautics
Act of 1945, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15Y2, §§ 22 et seq. (1971).
42. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
300 U.S. 655 (1937).
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full and complete ownership of land and the right to whatever superadjacent airspace
was necessary or convenient to the enjoyment of the land.48
Grounded upon this argument, the court affirmed the lower court's
decision that the plaintiff had suffered no actionable injury.
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in United States v.
Causby,44 allowed that there was no place in the modern world for the
doctrine: "To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog
these [air] highways, seriously interfere with their control and develop-
ment in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to
which only the public has a just claim."'45  Even with this, the problem
of airspace was not completely settled. While the public domain was
affirmatively asserted for navigable airspace, there remained the dilemma
surrounding the use of air immediately above the land:
[I]t is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must
have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.
Otherwise buildings could not be erected . . . . The landowner owns at least as
much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with
the land.46
Though national sovereignty gives to the government ownership of
airspace, it does not thereby cause any divesting of rights incident to the
ownership of the surface inuring to the landowner.47 In recent years,
decisions on actions brought by private landowners charging proprietary
taking through easement4 8 or inverse condemnation 49 by air traffic nui-
sances have reflected the principles set down in Causby. So, with the
exception of airspace which is used and enjoyed as an incident of land
ownership, the air above us is the navigable airspace of the public domain.
Therefore, while the Federal Aviation Administration is empowered to
control the use of airspace,50 one would certainly hope that public senti-
43. Id. at 757.
44. 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (low-flying military aircraft over plaintiff's chicken
farm).
45. Id. at 261. See also Chicago & S. Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103 (1948) wherein Justice Jackson noted that "ancient doctrines of pri-
vate ownership of the air as appurtenant to land titles had to be revised to make
aviation practically serviceable to our society." Id. at 107. But see Dettmar v.
County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 28 Ohio Misc. 35, 273 N.E.2d 921 (1971).
46. 328 U.S. at 264 [emphasis added].
47. Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal.2d 825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952), af'g in part, 232
P.2d 274 (Cal. App. 1951).
48. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), rev'g 402 Pa. 411, 168
A.2d 123 (1961).
49. Hoyle v. City of Charlotte, 276 N.C. 292, 172 S.E.2d 1 (1970); Thornburg
v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
50. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 301, 307, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1348 (1970).
It should be noted that Sears, Roebuck and Co. applied to the Federal Communi-
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ment would be afforded a hearing prior to the making of decisions ad-
versely affecting that public domain. 51
Cases which could provide one of the better analogies to distorted broad-
cast signals traveling over property boundaries would be those which con-
sidered allegations of nuisances attributed to illumination of another's
property. 52  An electric sign, seventy-two feet long and sixty-six feet
high which contained more than one thousand electric bulbs varying in
intensity from fifteen to one hundred watts, was held to be a nuisance in
New Jersey in 1923. 53 The sign was constructed in such a manner as
to face plaintiff's hotel, substantially illuminating some forty-five rooms
therein. The court found that such positioning, coupled with such intensity,
"may become a nuisance, if it (the light) materially interferes with the
ordinary comfort, physically, of human existence."5 4
Where an action was brought for interference with sleep and reasonable
enjoyment of property caused by the use of adjacent school property for
night baseball games, the trial court's ruling for the defendant school
district was reversed and the emission of light was enjoined.55 The
reviewing court in the Hansen case was unable to agree that the nuisance
per accidens, when balanced with the rights of the plaintiffs to freedom
from interference in late-night hours, should not be the subject of injunctive
relief. The school district was enjoined from late-evening use of the lighted
ball field.
Other cases have arisen where the private property owner is faced with
encroaching lights and noises from adjoining property.56 Plaintiffs in the
business of operating outdoor theatres have been unable to prevail as
cations Commission for permission to place antennae on its building. Approval was
granted June 19, 1972.
51. But see Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 420 F.2d 188
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (denial of intervention request by group claiming an interest in
air traffic noise, pollution and safety hazards).
52. See Shepler v. Kansas Milling Co., 128 Kan. 554, 278 P. 757 (1929) (natu-
ral light).
53. The Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan Corp., 95 N.J. Eq. 188, 122 A. 749 (1923).
54. Id. at 191, 122 A. at 750.
55. Hansen v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 61 Idaho 109, 98 P.2d 959
(1940).
56. See Five Oaks Corp. v. Gathmann, 190 Md. 348, 58 A.2d 656 (1948) where
defendant was permanently enjoined from operating bright electric lights around
swimming pool and parking lot as well as nickelodeons and carry-out service after
10:00 p.m. as nuisance to adjoining residential property. Nugent v. Melville Shoe
Corp., 280 Mass. 469, 182 N.E. 825 (1932) (nuisance found where defendant main-
tained no preventive measure to keep construction noise low and illumination from
nitrogen lights from shining into plaintiff's bedroom after midnight).
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litigants. 57 The courts have found the plaintiffs' businesses too susceptible
to injury and therefore have hesitated to find an actionable trespass or
nuisance.
Theatre owners in Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows' s sought
to enjoin the nuisance caused by lighting around defendant's race track.
In spite of claims that the natural darkness was destroyed, materially inter-
fering with the showing of films, the court found the intensity of the
lights to be no greater than the intensity of the full moon. Reaching the
conclusion that the defendant's act was deemed merely to be a damnum
absque injuria, the court held that reflection of lights was but one of the
burdens placed upon a property owner by modern city living.5 9  In
addition, the court argued that it could not allow a man to prevail who
increased his neighbor's liabilities by applying his own property to a
special and delicate use whether as a business interest or merely for
pleasure.6 0
The Illinois Supreme Court made similar findings in the Belmar
Drive-In case in 1966.6 1 Plaintiff theatre operator's claim against the
Toll Highway Commission and concessionaires at a tollroad "oasis"
service center was held to state no sufficient cause of action for nuisance
from artificial lights interfering with the movie screen. For successful
litigation, "the act, structure or device complained about must cause some
injury, real and not fanciful, and must work some material annoyance,
inconvenience or other injury to the person or property of another. '62
Thus, the light cases show a desire of the courts to follow the principle
of nuisance set out previously. Parties are protected against unreasonable
interference with enjoyment of their property, but only so long as the use
of their property is not unreasonably sensitive to outside vexations.
While these cases have involved light transmitted by the defendant,
there have been nuisance suits attacking construction on defendant's
property which acts to deprive the plaintiff of natural light. 63  In
Fontainebleau Hotel Corporation v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.,6 4 a
57. See, e.g., Ampitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d
847 (1948); Sheridan Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. State, 384 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 1963).
58. 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948).
59. Id. at 362, 198 P.2d at 858.
60. Id. at 353, 198 P.2d at 854.
61. Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 34 Ill.
2d 544, 216 N.E.2d 788 (1966).
62. Id. at 547, 216 N.E.2d at 790-91.
63. See Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10 (1850).
64. 114 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1959). In City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel.
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case discussed by the Illinois court in Sears, the owner of the Eden Roc
Hotel brought action to enjoin the continuing construction of a fourteen-
story addition to defendant's building. The addition would cause plain-
tiff's tourist swimming pool and sunbathing area to be shaded during after-
noon hours.
The injunction granted by the trial court was reversed, the appellate
court noting that in the absence of an American decision granting land-
owners a legal right to free light and air flow across his neighbor's ad-
joining land, the court would be constrained to adhere to the rule that
where a structure serves a useful and beneficial purpose, it does not give rise to a
cause of action, either for damages or for an injunction under the maxim sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, even though it causes injury to another by cutting off the
light and air and interfering with the view that would otherwise be available over
adjoining land in its natural state . . .65
In essence, we are again faced with the proposition that not every injury
will result in recovery because no legal right is injured-damnum absque
injuria.
The right to "ancient," or natural lights has been declared to have
been repudiated today.66 The Musumeci decision, which related to an
action to enjoin a spite fence on the ground that the complainant was
deprived of access to the natural flow of light and air, recognized that
the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas was "sound and salutory"
in the ultimate, expeditious furtherance of justice but warned that it
"should not be applied so as gratuitously to confer upon an adjacent prop-
erty owner incorporeal rights incidental to his ownership of land which
the law does not sanction. '67
As a case of first instance, the plaintiffs in Sears68 made use of the
analogies to freedom from interference from light and to public interest
in the interference-free use of airspace to build the foundation for their
asserted claim.6 9 Whereas, arguendo, the 1,450 foot Sears Tower would
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 108 So.2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), cert. denied,
111 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1959) ordinance limiting height of buildings along ocean held
invalid, mandamus to compel building permit granted.
65. 114 So.2d at 359.
66. Id. See also Musumeci v. Leonardo, 77 R.I. 255, 75 A.2d 175 (1950).
67. 77 R.I. at 260, 75 A.2d at 177.
68. 52 Ill.2d 301, 287 N.E.2d 677 (1972).
69. Note that plaintiff Hoogasian also made an analogy between public right
to freedom from broadcast interference via the airways and public right to freedom
from interference of navigable waters, a public nuisance in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 100/, § 26 (1971). See Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851); But see David M. Swain & Son v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R., 252 Ill. 622, 97 N.E. 247 (1911).
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"transmit" distorted signals in the sense that it would convey them by
reflection, the court found that a more homogeneous definition of trans-
mission would have to be applied to this fact situation. As a result,
noting that defendant's property was not the direct "source" of the trans-
mission, but merely the property over which signals initiated by third
parties travelled, the court concluded that the artificial light cases were
inapplicable to these facts. 70
No attempt was made in the court's discussion of the Belmar Drive-In
case to compare the delicate nature of television reception to the hyper-
sensitive use doctrine of nuisance. Nor did it specifically declare the
interference damnum absque injuria. It should also be noted that the
light cases dealt with private nuisances, while the Sears case was based upon
a public nuisance theory, but the court did not indicate that this was a
deciding factor.
Instead, the Illinois court preferred to rely upon the rationale in the
Fontainebleau Hotel7' case. It found that the interference with light,
rather than interference by light, was more analogous to distortion of
television broadcast reception. The court adopted the rationale against
relief arguing that "otherwise one party would have the right to enjoin
his neighbor from building a home or any other structure on adjacent
property if such building interfered with television reception. '72  The
problem to which the court addressed itself is one with some measure of
gravity. Probably every large metropolitan area has reception problems
where adjacent buildings are much taller than reception antennae. Indeed,
one could anticipate innumerable private actions between residents of five-
story buildings and owners of nearby twenty-story structures. However,
these would be private rather than public nuisance actions. But the
courts could have declared the Sears Tower to be a public nuisance based
upon the unique fact that this building is taller than all others in Chicago
and that injunctive relief would be remedial for at least 105,000 citizens, 73
if not more.
Certainly, in private suits relying upon a Sears public nuisance argument,
keen application of the special damage rule would circumvent the possi-
bility of multiple litigation between neighbors. Plaintiffs would fail to show
either that special damage was suffered or, indeed, even that the commun-
70. 52 Ill.2d at 304, 287 N.E.2d at 678.
71. 114 So.2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
72. 52 Ill.2d at 305, 287 N.E.2d at 679.
73. State's Attorney Hoogasian alleged that some 105,000 Lake County resi-
dents would suffer impaired reception.
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ity was injured thereby making the alleged nuisance public. Had the
Sears court found an actionable public nuisance, the resulting litigation
would have attacked other Chicago buildings which dwarf television
broadcast antennae. For instance, the Hancock Center, which will have
signals emitted from its broadcast facilities distorted by the taller Sears
Tower, is itself taller than the broadcast towers on Marina City, the
Board of Trade Building and others.
The case most nearly on point which was cited by the court in Sears is
Richmond Brothers, Inc. v. Hagemann.74  Plaintiff operated a radio
broadcasting station with a transmitting tower located in a marsh adjacent
to the land on which the defendants planned to build a five-story building.
The plaintiff sought a bill to enjoin the creation of a private nuisance
by erection of a structure adjacent to plaintiff's tower. The structure
would reflect and distort radio signals to an unascertainable degree. 75
Finding no contrary statutory provisions, the court held that the broadcast
station had not used its property in such a manner as to condemn
adjoining premises to a servitude, and allowed the construction to proceed.
The lower court in Richmond had ruled in the words of the reviewing
court, that the broadcast station had "no express or implied easement or
easement by prescription and no right by virtue of its FCC license to
interfere with the use to which the adjoining owners may put their land."176
Since neither the easement nor the federal right claims had been presented
for review, the reviewing court made no further consideration of those
issues.
Making use of the Richmond decision, the Sears court contended that
"[t]he responsibility . . . for inadequate television reception in certain
areas rests more with the broadcasters' choice of location than with the
height of defendant's building."' 77 So long as the actual transmission came
totally from independent third persons, the defendant's use of his property
could not be restricted. 78 Further, the Illinois court agreed with the
Richmond decision and general rule that buildings may be erected to any
74. - Mass. -, 268 N.E.2d 680 (1971).
75. Plaintiff also contended defendant would maintain a private nuisance by
filling part and diverting part of a creek which the plaintiff contended was a
"navigable stream" and would diminish the electrical conductivity of the land. Find-
ing the stream to be without water at low tide, the lower court held that plaintiff
had no riparian rights to be injured. This decision was affirmed. Id. at -, 268
N.E.2d at 681-82.
76. Id. at -, 268 N.E.2d at 682.
77. 52 Ill.2d at 305, 287 N.E.2d at 679.
78. Id. at 305-06, 287 N.E.2d at 679.
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height in the absence of reasonable police regulations enacted to protect
the public health, safety and welfare. 79  Sears had complied with all such
regulations under municipal and state provisions.
Richmond allowed no recovery for the broadcaster. What about the
receiver? On plaintiff's argument regarding the use of airspace and the
public interest involved in keeping it free from interference, the Sears
court admitted that United States v. Causbys° stood for the proposition
that a property owner had no claim to unlimited use of airspace. However,
the court reasserted the Causby principle that, where there is no inter-
ference with aircraft, "'[the landowner owns at least as much of the
space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the
land.' "81 By complying with local zoning and federal aviation regulations,
Sears' proposed occupation of 1,450 feet above the ground was entirely
lawful and within the public interest.
There being no public nuisance in Sears' action, where might a remedy
lie? From the premise that broadcasting is in the public interest, consider-
ation may be given to the federal government and its jurisdiction over
communications. The Communications Act of 193482 provides that the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) shall be entrusted with a
duty of safeguarding the public interest in communications.8 3  While this
duty has been recognized by the courts,8 4 the Supreme Court has suggested
that the only public interest with which the FCC is charged is that involving
the granting of licenses to broadcasters.8 5
Whereas licenses are to be granted with the public interest in mind and
whereas the FCC is empowered to "make such regulations not inconsistent
79. See City of Nokomis v. Sullivan, 14 Ill.2d 417, 153 N.E.2d 48 (1958);
Atty. Gen'l. v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899).
80. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
81. 52 Ill.2d at 306, 287 N.E.2d at 679.
82. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970). Designed to regulate radio and telegraph,
the Act has been applied to control of television transmission. Radio Corp. of
America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951), aff'g 95 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. 1ll.
1950).
83. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 309(a) (1970). See K.
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.03 (1958).
84. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942). See also National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Voliva v. WCBD, Inc., 313
Il. App. 177, 39 N.E.2d 685 (1942).
85. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 131-32 (1945). But
see Deep South Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 278 F.2d 264, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
suggesting that the FCC has statutory authority [47 U.S.C. § 303(n)] to inquire
into the tower structure of a licensee to determine whether it "will be safe and will
provide uninterrupted service [which] is a clearly relevant public interest considera-
tion." Id. at 267.
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with law as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between sta-
tions,"'86 yet, indeed, FCC regulations specify that "television broadcast
stations are not protected from any interference . . . caused by the grant
of a new station .... ,,s By providing for regulations in the public
interest, the "Communications Act of 1934 did not create new private
rights."88 As a result, private actions do not accrue to candidates for
public office demanding equal broadcast time 9 or to the staff and listeners
of a campus radio station closed by university officials. 90 Finally, decisions
also provide that there is no actionable trespass in the transmission of sig-
nals and impulses.' So, public interest considered or not, the Communi-
cations Act is hardly a source of remedy for actions by transmitters or
receivers of ultimately distorted signals.
Provided that appropriate zoning ordinances and aviation regulations 92
are followed, Sears will stand for the rule that building construction may
not be enjoined upon an allegation sounding in nuisance that television
signal distortion will ensue. Nor does it seem that a court of equity will
use its power to grant mandatory injunctions ordering buildings razed or
reconstructed as in Welton, 93 in the absence of legislative action making
construction of buildings which will reflect broadcast signals an abatable
public nuisance. In preparing such legislation, television viewers as a
community should be protected, while private application to single house-
hold or localized neighborhood interference should be discouraged.
What other relief might the viewer seek if litigation or legislation will
not solve the problem? The continued growth of community antenna
television systems (CATV) 94-- commonly known as cable TV-may be
an answer. Designed to bring clear reception by cable to areas where
reception was nonexistent or difficult, CATV was introduced in 194995
86. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(f) (1970). See also Indiana
Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 407 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1968) where public interest
is equated with reasonable television service.
87. 47 C.F.R. § 73.612(a) (1972) [emphasis added]. See also Pikes Peak
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
88. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942).
89. Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 85 (7th Cir.
1962).
90. Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
91. See, e.g., Brannan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 210 Tenn. 697, 362 S.W.2d
236 (1962).
92. See, e.g., FAA Reg., 14 C.F.R. §§ 77.13(a)(1), 77.17(c), 77.71 (1973).
93. Welton v. 40 E. Oak St. Bldg. Corp., 70 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1934).
94. See generally 86 C.J.S. Tels. & Tels., Radio & Television § 316.1 (Supp.
1973).
95. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
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and has also been subjected to FCC regulation.9" On the state level,
Illinois grants the power of control over CATV by statute to the corporate
authority of individual cities and villages.07 In retrospect, this apparent
remedy has not escaped being the subject of litigation itself concerning
the validity of regulatory ordinances, 98 copyright, 90 antitrust and inter-
ference with contract.' 00 One result of that litigation is further foundation
for the idea that "there is no property right in the television signal .... 01
CONCLUSION
It has been said "that the common law is not a static but a dynamic and
growing thing"' 0 2 and that, "flexibility and capacity for growth and adap-
tation is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law.' 0 3 There
has not yet been enough growth to protect the television viewer, nor
enough flexibility. There have been those instances where society has so
surpassed the expectations of its legal forefathers as to cry out for growth
in the law. The reply has not uncommonly been a proclivity toward
gradual action.
96. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); Valley
Vision, Inc. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1968).
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-11 (1971). Also note municipal authority
over streets and public ways, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-80-2, -3, -8, -11 (1971).
98. See Illinois Broadcasting Co. v. City of Decatur, 96 Ill.App.2d 454, 238
N.E.2d 261 (1968); Community Antenna v. City of Wichita, 205 Kan. 537, 471 P.2d
360 (1970).
99. Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc.,
196 F. Supp. 315 (D. Idaho 1961). See also United Artists Television, Inc. v.
Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
100. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965); Herald Publishing Co. v. Florida Antennavision, Inc.,
173 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1965). See generally W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 129 (4th
ed. 1971).
101. Dispatch, Inc. v. City of Erie, 249 F. Supp. 267, 272 (W.D. Pa. 1965),
vacated, 364 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1966), on remand, Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. City
of Erie, 286 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Pa. 1967), ajj'd, 396 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1968).
See also Intermountain Electronics, Inc. v. Tintic School Dist., 14 Utah 2d 86,
377 P.2d 783 (1963) where the Utah court noted that "[t]he electro-magnetic waves
existing in the space above the earth which carry ...TV signals are of such a
nature that they obviously cannot be reduced to physical possession like real or
personal property, or be put to an exclusive beneficial use like water . . . . The
right to use this signal-carrying capacity cannot properly be regarded as so pos-
sessed ...by any one person to the exclusion of others, unless it is affirmatively
so prescribed or regulated by law." Id. at 88, 377 P.2d at 785. But see Cable Vi-
sion, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989
(1965).
102. Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645, 648
(4th Cir. 1942).
103. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884).
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Today, the environmental boom is an excellent example that, as often
happens, change has arrived at a leisurely gait. The smoke or dirty water
which was once an unactionable nuisance incident to life in the city is
now the subject of pollution legislation and successful litigation sounding
in the public interest.104  With the advent of the megalopolis in certain
areas of this country, we can no longer clearly distinguish between city,
suburb and what was not long ago the rural community. Some city
environmental discomforts may be allowed to exist because of the public
interest of the city itself, but what public interest is served for the rural
property owner whose atmosphere and rivers are loaded with city waste
that did not stay in the city where people must accept it? Or, for that
matter, what public interest is served when a city building distorts recep-
tion of newsworthy, educational and entertainment matter in the homes of
persons living upwards of fifty miles from the city?
We may only speculate as to the day when owners of spiraling buildings
will not be allowed to build above broadcast antennae or will muster all
available technology to perfectly contrive nonreflective building skins.
Until that day, remedy lies in relatively expensive CATV, taller antennae,
promulgation of other available entertainment and news sources or con-
cession that, without an actionable legal right to freedom from the annoy-
ance of reception interference, the ghosts on your screen will have to
become part of a new American public incredulity.
Thomas K. Mc Queen
104. See generally Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
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